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SUMMARIES 
In his 1908 paper on the Well-Ordering Theorem, 
Zermelo claimed to have found "Russell's Paradox" 
independently of Russell. Here we present a short 
note, written by E. Husserl in 1902, which contains 
a detailed exposition of Zermelo's original version 
of the paradox. We add some comments concerning the 
date of Zermelo's discovery, the circumstances which 
caused Husserl to write down Zermelo's argument, and 
the argument itself. 
In seiner Arbeit iiber den Wohlordnungssatz aus 
dem Jahre 1908 behauptet Zermelo, "Russell's Paradox" 
unabh;ingig von Russell gefunden zu haben. Hier stellen 
wir eine kurze Notiz vor, die von E. Husserl 1902 
verfasst wurde und eine genaue Darstellung von Zermelos 
ursprijnglicher Version des Paradoxons enth;ilt. Einige 
Bemerkungen dazu werden angefiigt, so zum Zeitpunkt der 
Entdeckung des Beweises durch Zermelo, zu den VmsGinden, 
welche Husserl zur Niederschrift dieser Notiz bewegten, 
und zu Zermelos Beweis selbst. 
Dons son travail de 1908 sur le theoreme de 
bonordre Zermelo affirme d'avoir trouve le "paradoxe 
de Russell" independamment de Russell. Nous presentons 
ici une courte note, &rite par E. Husserl en 1902, qui 
contient un expose exact du paradoxe dans la version 
originale de Zermelo. On a ajoute quelques remarques 
sur la date de la decouverte de Zermelo, sur les cir- 
constances qui ont amen6 Husserl 2 &rire cette note, 
et finalement sur la preuve de Zermelo. 
1. HUSSERL'S NOTE 
There are a number of indications in mathematical literature 
that Zermelo discovered what today is called "Russell's Paradox" 
[l] independently of Russell, although until now no exact account 
of Zermelo's argument seemed to exist. However, we present here a 
note which contains a detailed exposition of Zermelo's proof. The 
note was found in Husserl's Nachlass in one of the copies of his re 
view [1891] of [Schrijder 18901. Nevertheless, after Husserl's 
death in 1938, the paper remained unnoticed among a number of 
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0th Ler manuscripts until B. Rang found it in the course of edi 
[HL lsserl 19781. There the text is presented in the original 
Ger man, and further comments on the matter are given, especiz 
COT icerning Husserl's review. The text of the note, in Englis 
fol .lows. 
Zermelo informs (16 April 1902) concerning p. 272 of 
Schrijder reviews 
In the issue, not in the method of proof, Schriider 
is right, namely: 
A set M, which contains each of its subsets 
m,m',... as elements, is an inconsistent set, i.e., 
.t 
11 
j1- 
n 
.ing 
7Y 
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such a set, if at all treated as a set, leads to con- 
tradictions. 
PROOF. We consider those subsets m which do not 
contain themselves as elements. 
(M contains as elements each of its subsets; hence 
subsets of M will also contain certain subsets as ele- 
ments, themselves not [being] elements, and now we con- 
sider just those subsets m, which may perhaps contain 
other subsets, but not themselves as elements.) 
These constitute in their totality a set M0 
(i . e., the set of all subsets of M which do not con- 
tain themselves as elements), and now I prove of MO, 
(1) that it does not contain itself as an ele- 
ment, 
(2) that it contains itself as an element. 
Concerning (1): MO, being a subset of M, is it- 
self an element of M, but not an element of MO. For, 
otherwise, MO would contain as an element a subset of 
M (namely, MO itself) which contains itself as an ele- 
ment, and that would contradict the notion of MO. 
Concerning (2): Hence MO itself is a subset of M 
which does not contain itself as an element. Thus it 
must be an element of MQ. 
Of course, a set with a definition as M is the 
set of all sets. This is also an example that a set 
may contain itself as an element: The set of all sets 
is indeed a set. 
The text as shown in facsimile (Fig. 1) is partly written in the 
shorthand known as "Gabelsberger Stenographie." Note that the 
last paragraph is written in pencil, whereas the preceding text 
is written in ink. 
2. ON THE SOURCES OF ZERMELO'S DISCOVERY 
Until now, two sources were available from which an indepen- 
dent discovery of Russel.l's antinomy by Zermelo could be concluded. 
One source is a remark made by Zermelo in 1908. Referring to the 
publication of the antinomy in Russell's book The Principles of 
Mathematics (19031, he stated in a footnote to his second paper 
on the well-ordering theorem: "I had however discovered this 
antinomy myself, independently of Russell, and informed Prof. 
Hilbert, among others, of it even before 1903" [Zermelo 1908a, 
116-1171 [2]. 
The second source is a letter which Hilbert wrote to Frege 
in 1903. Russell had imparted the antinomy to Frege on June 16, 
1902 [Frege 1976, 211-2121, having discovered it, according to 
his own record, in June 1901 [Russell 19511 [3]. Frege then dis- 
cussed the problem in the Nachwort of his Grundgesetz der Arith- 
metik. Referring to this Nachwort, Hilbert wrote to Frege on 
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November 7, 1903: "Your example at the end of the book is known 
to us here...." In a footnote he added:" . . . I think Dr. Zermelo 
[41 found it 3-4 years ago . ..". he continued: "I found other, 
even more convincing contradictions already 4-5 years ago" [Frege 
1976, 79-801. 
In contrast to these sources, Husserl's note is the first 
document in which Zermelo's discovery is not only claimed but 
also confirmed by an exposition of the proof itself. Obviously 
Husserl was one of those colleagues "among others" (in addition 
to Hilbert) to whom Zermelo communicated his proof. 
From the date of the note one might at first assume that Zer- 
melo discovered the antinomy early in 1902. However, according 
to Hilbert's statement (quoted above), Zermelo must have found 
it by 1900, perhaps as early as 1899, i.e., one or two years be- 
fore Russell. That Zermelo knew of the antinomy prior to 1902 
is also suggested by the fact that the reason for Zermelo's com- 
munication was evidently his reading of Husserl's review of 
SchrBder's Algebra der Logik [18901, and not his discovery of the 
proof: Zermelo wanted to explain to Husserl that Schroder (in an 
argument, discussed below, concerning the universal class) is 
right " in the issue" ("in der Sache") although not "in the method 
of proof" ("in der Beweisfiihrung") . Thus one may assume that 
Zermelo read Husserl's review in 1902 and took this opportunity 
to tell Husserl about his proof. As to when Zermelo found the 
antinomy, the primary relevant document still seems to be Hilbert's 
letter to Frege. 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUSSERL'S NOTE TO SCHR6DER"S 
ALGEBRA DER LOGIK 
We owe the existence of Husserl's note to a rather dubious 
"proof" which appeared in Schrijder's fourth lecture [18901. In 
Section 9 of this lecture, Schrijder intended to demonstrate that 
Boole's interpretation of the universal class ("class 1") as the 
class which contains everything conceivable (the "universe of 
discourse") leads to a contradiction. His argument proceeded 
as follows: 
Granted that 0 is contained in every class which 
can be derived from the manifold 1, so that it is valid 
that Oea, 0 should be the subject for every predicate. 
If we take a to be the class of those classes of the 
manifold which are equal to 1 (and this would cer- 
tainly be permissible if everything conceivable could 
be included in the manifold 1), then this class would 
essentially encompass only one object, namely, the 
symbol 1 itself, or rather the whole of the manifold 
which comprises its meaning--and besides this, how- 
ever, "nothing," hence 0. Since 1 and 0 thus consti- 
tute the class of those objects which are to be viewed 
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as equal to 1, it would have to be recognized not only 
that 1 = 1, but also that 0 = l.... [Schriider 1890, 2451 
In his review [1891], Husserl criticized this argument be- 
cause it did not differentiate between the relation of class- 
membership and that of class-inclusion: 
This argument, which is at first sight baffling, 
is sophistic. If we constitute class K, the elements 
of which themselves are classes, namely, those that 
are equal to 1, then K obviously contains class 1 as 
an element, since 1 = 1. But does this K also con- 
tain class 0 as an element? By no means. To be sure, 
it contains, as does every other class, 0, but as a 
subordinate class and not as an element. According 
to the definition, it is valid for all elements of 
class K that they are equal to 1; but this does not 
hold for their subordinate classes. Thus 0 = 1 does 
not hold. [Husserl 1979, 361 
Apparently it was Zermelo's intention to warn Husserl that 
a more serious problem is hidden in the notion of a universal 
class. 
It is surprising that Schrijder himself tried to resolve his 
"contradiction" in a manner which seemingly recognizes its deeper 
aspects: He introduced a hierarchy of manifolds of various levels 
which anticipated the basic idea of the simple theory of types. 
Of course, the principal reason for defining such a hierarchy 
was not the existence of some profound set-theoretical paradox, 
but simply the need to have a "substitute for the distinction 
between= ands" (see [Church 1976, 1511; see also [Grattan- 
Guinness 1975, 124-1251). In this way Schrijder introduced a 
postulate which does not allow the arbitrary constitution of 
sets, thus attempting to revise Boole's concept of the universe 
of discourse. According to Schrbder's proposal, the manifold 1 
no longer contains everything possibly conceivable, but is in- 
stead subject to the limitation "that among its elements that 
are given as individuals, there be no classes which themselves 
comprehend elements of the same manifold as individuals within 
them“ [Schrijder 1890, 2481. Thus the subsets of a given manifold 
(which are not allowed to be elements of it) are taken as elements 
of a second. manifold; and continuing in this manner, a hierarchy 
is constituted in which the concepts of the universal class and 
of the null class (empty set) are defined only relative to a 
certain level. By accepting Schr8der's postulate, one could no 
longer carry through Zermelo's argument: The class M of Husserl's 
note contains each of its subclasses as elements, and therefore 
contains, as elements, classes the elements of which are also 
elements of M. Thus, according to Schrbder's postulate, the forma 
tion of M is not permissible. 
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4. SOME REMARKS ON ZERMELO'S PROOF 
By his argument, carried out in naive (Cantorian) set theory, 
Zermelo presented a new example of an inconsistent set. The first 
such example appeared in 1897 with the so-called "Burali-Forti 
antinomy," which concerned the inconsistency of the set of all 
ordinal numbers. In suggesting that such an inconsistent set 
should not be "treated as a set," Zermelo gave an indication 
of the methodological consequence of his result as adopted in 
his later investigations in set theory. 
While the first part of the proof is clearly formulated, the 
last paragraph of the note is somewhat puzzling, since it simply 
states that "the set of all sets is indeed a set," without men- 
tioning as a conclusion of the preceding argument that such a 
set cannot exist (or is "inconsistent"). As an inspection of 
Husserl's manuscripts suggests (see last remark of Section l), 
that remark was almost certainly a later addition by Husserl, 
and not part of Zermelo's proof. On the other hand, one may 
assume that the main part of the proof was correctly restated by 
Husserl: first, there were very similar formulations in [Zermelo 
1908a, 31-321, where it is shown that "every set M has at least 
one subset MO which is not an element of M." The same steps may 
be found in the proof in one of Zermelo's unpublished notebooks 
containing notes for lectures on set theory [51. Furthermore, it 
should be mentioned that in a manuscript of Husserl's which con- 
tains private notes on set theory (in the possession of the 
Husserl Archiv in Leuven), Zermelo's argument is repeated with 
no major modifications, and the last paragraph mentioned above 
is missing. 
Although Zermelo's idea of using the property that a set is 
not a member of itself coincides with the central point in 
Russell's proof, there is a difference between them concerning 
the contexts to which they refer. While Zermelo's primary inter- 
est is Cantorian set theory, Russell also recognizes the effect 
of the paradox on a logical foundation of mathematics as pre- 
sented, for example, in Frege's work 161. This difference may 
at least partially explain why Zermelo (unlike Russell) did not 
publish his proof. Probably Zermelo was not familiar with Frege's 
work and thus could not realize that his idea would have shaken 
the basis of Frege's logicistic program. Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to assume that Zermelo, who was acquainted with the 
"Burali-Forti antinomy," was so well aware of the problems involved 
in the naive set concept that he considered his proof merely as 
a confirmation of previously known difficulties and not as a new, 
fundamental insight. This point of view is also supported by a 
passage in his paper [1908a, 118-1191 where he speaks of "the 
elementary form that Russell gave to the set-theoretic anti- 
nomies . ..." and, referring to the Burali-Forti antinomy, goes 
on to say "that the solution of these difficulties is not to be 
HM 8 The "Russell Paradox" 21 
sought in the surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable 
restriction of the notion of set." He adds the remark that already 
while writing his first paper on the well-ordering theorem in 1904 
(and thus possibly earlier) he had had "such reservations in mind." 
NOTES 
1. In the literature the term "Zermelo-Russellsches Para- 
doxon" may also be found; cf. [Fraenkel 1927, 211, or [Thiel 19721. 
2. Translations of Zermelo's papers are all from [van 
Heijenoort 19671. All other translations are ours. 
3. For other sources concerning the date of Russell's dis- 
covery (indicating "May 1901" or "spring 1901") cf. IGrattan- 
Guinness 1978, 134-1351. 
4. Zermelo was among the members of Hilbert's circle in 
Gijttingen. Husserl and Zermelo had been colleagues (as Privat- 
dozenten) at the University of GEttingen since 1901. 
5. We found this notebook entitled "Vorlesung iiber Mengen- 
lehre 1900/01," in Zermelo's Nachlass (kept at the University 
Library of Freiburg). Whereas Zermelo used only the right-hand 
pages of the book (and we could not find a hint of the paradoxes 
there) for that lecture, he later added, on the left-hand pages, 
further remarks concerning inconsistent sets and the axioms of 
set theory. Unfortunately, we were unable to fix the date of 
these remarks. It could be rewarding (although tedious) to ana- 
lyze the whole notebook in detail, as well as other manuscripts 
of the Nachlass (most of them in shorthand). 
6. It should be mentioned, however, that the roots of 
Russell's argument may also be located in Cantorian set theory, 
especially in Cantor's diagonal argument proving the uncountabi- 
lity of the set of the real numbers; cf. [Grattan-Guinness 19781. 
REFERENCES 
Church, A. 1976. Schrader's anticipation of the simple theory 
of type Erkenntnis 10, 407-411. Reprinted from The Journal 
of Unified Science (Erkenntnis) 9 (1939), 149-152. 
Fraenkel, A. 1927. Zehn Vorlesungen iiber die Grundlegung der 
Mengenlehre, Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner. 
Frege, G. 1976. Wissehschaftlicher Briefwechsel, G. Gabriel, H. 
Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A. Veraart, eds. Hamburg: 
Meiner. 
Grattan-Guinness, I. 1975 Wiener on the logics of Russell and 
Schrbder. An account of his doctoral thesis, and of his 
discussion of it with Russell. Annals of Science 32, 103- 
132. 
Grattan-Guinness, I. 1978 How Bertrand Russell discovered his 
paradox, Historia Mathematics 5, 127-137. 
Husserl, E. 1891. Besprechung von E. Schrbder, Vorlesungen iiber 
die Algebra der Logik (Exakte Logik), Vol. I. Leipzig 1890, 
22 B. Rang and W. Thomas HM 8 
Gattingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1891, 243-278. Also in 
Husserl, E., dufs;itze und Rezensionen (1890-1910), mit 
ergsnzenden Texten herausgegeben von B. Rang, Husserliana, 
vol. XXII, pp. 3-43. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978. 
Russell, B. 1951. My mental development. In: The philosophy 
of Bertrand Russell, P. A. Schilpp, ed. New York. 
Schrijder, E. 1890. Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik (Ex- 
akte Logik), Vol. I. Leipzig; reprinted, New York: Chelsea 
1966. 
Thiel, C. 1972. Grundlagenkrise und Grundlagenstreit. Meisen- 
heim: A. Hein. 
van Heijenoort, J. 1967. From Frege to Gijdel. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press. 
Zermelo, E. 1908a. Neuer Beweis fiir die MEglichkeit einer 
Wohlordnung. Mathematische dnnalen 65, 107-128. Translate 
in [van Heijenoort 1967, 183-1981. 
Zermelo, E. 1908b. Untersuchungen iiber die Grundlagen der Men- 
genlehre I, Mathematische dnnalen 65, 261-281. Translated in 
[van Heijenoort 1967, 199-2751. 
